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INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence is a deeply rooted problem that exists in every
country in the world.1 For the most part, however, the international
community has yet to create effective legal standards that exclusively
address domestic violence. Despite this unfortunate void, the rights
of battered women may be asserted under international and regional
human rights conventions that are legally binding upon ratifying
states. The International Bill of Human Rights, comprised of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”),2 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)3 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”),4 sets forth general human rights standards that victims of
1. In a 2000 report, Amnesty International indicated that:
Violence in the home is a truly global phenomenon. The figures may vary in
different countries but the suffering and its causes are similar around the
world . . . . According to World Bank figures, at least 20 per cent of women
around the world have been physically abused or sexually assaulted. Official
reports in the USA say that a woman is battered every 15 seconds and 700,000
are raped every year. In India, studies have found that more than 40 per cent
of married women reported being kicked, slapped or sexually abused for
reasons such as their husbands’ dissatisfaction with their cooking or cleaning,
jealousy, and a variety of other motives. At least 60 women were killed in
domestic violence in Kenya in 1998-99, and 35 per cent of women in Egypt
reported being beaten by their husbands. For millions of women the home is
not a haven but a place of terror.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BROKEN BODIES, SHATTERED MINDS: TORTURE AND ILLTREATMENT OF WOMEN 10-11 (2000) [hereinafter AI 2000 REPORT], available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact400012001 (last visited May 18, 2004).
See generally DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A GLOBAL VIEW (Randal W. Summers & Allan M.
Hoffman eds., 2002); see generally TOO CLOSE TO HOME: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE
AMERICAS (Andrew R. Morrison & Maria Loreto Biehl eds., 1999).
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR,
3rd Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR], available at
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b1udhr.htm (last visited May 18, 2004).
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/
instree/b3ccpr.htm (last visited May 18, 2004).
4. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
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domestic violence may invoke against their state of citizenship. That
is, battered women who have exhausted all domestic remedies and
who still find that the state has failed to adequately address their
grievances, may hold the state liable if that state is a party to the above
instruments. The same can be done under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(“CEDAW”)5 together with its Optional Protocol,6 and under the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”).7 Likewise, regional
instruments may offer protection for battered women. The European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“ECHR”),8 the American Convention on Human Rights
(“ACHR”),9 together with the Inter-American Convention on the
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women
(“Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women”),10 and
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African
Charter”)11 are the major regional human rights documents that may
be invoked by victims of domestic violence. The following is a
summary of applicable provisions from the aforementioned
documents as well as a brief explanation of how the various human
rights bodies operate. The most critical failing of the institutions
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR], available at http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/instree/b2esc.htm (last visited May 18, 2004).
5. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW], available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/e1cedaw.htm (last visited May 18, 2004).
6. See generally Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83 [hereinafter CEDAW
Optional Protocol], available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
cedawopprot-2000.html (last visited May 18, 2004).
7. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT],
available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/h2catoc.htm (last visited May
18, 2004).
8. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR], available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf (last visited May 20,
2004).
9. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter ACHR], available at http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/oasinstr/
zoas3con.htm (last visited May 20, 2004).
10. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication
of Violence Against Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534, [hereinafter InterAmerican Convention on Violence Against Women], available at http://www1.umn.
edu/humanrts/instree/brazil1994.html (last visited May 20, 2004).
11. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58,
[hereinafter African Charter], available at http://www.hrcr.org/docs/Banjul/afrhr.
html (last visited May 20, 2004).
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discussed below is the lack of adequate enforcement. That is, while
some of the international and regional courts are capable of
rendering binding decisions, the ultimate responsibility lays with the
States’ Parties to the various conventions to implement these
decisions.
I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DEFINED
Domestic violence is one of the numerous forms of violence against
women that have been identified worldwide.12 The United Nations
defined the term “violence against women” in a 1993 declaration as
“any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result
in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty, whether occurring in public or private life.”13 The declaration
further notes that violence against women can occur within the family
or within the general community and that it may be condoned or
perpetrated by government officials.14 Having included domestic
violence as a form of violence against women, the United Nations
further explained that:
The term ‘domestic violence’ is used to describe actions and
omissions that occur in varying relationships. The term is used
narrowly to cover incidents of physical attack, when it may take the
form of physical and sexual violations. . . . The result of such
physical violence can range from bruising to killing; what may often
start out as apparently minor attacks can escalate both in intensity
and frequency. . . . ‘[D]omestic violence’ . . . [also] include[s]
psychological or mental violence, which can consist of repeated
verbal abuse, harassment, confinement and deprivation of physical,
financial and personal resources . . . .15
12. See Johanna Bond & Robin Phillips, Violence Against Women as a Human
Rights Violation: International Institutional Responses, in SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 481, 482 (Claire M. Renzetti et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter
SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN] (citing other forms of violence against
women including “rape, sexual assault, forced prostitution, female genital mutilation,
female infanticide, and sexual harassment. Other lesser known forms of violence
against women include honor killing . . . dowry violence . . . [and] sex trafficking in
women . . . .”).
13. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res.
48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., art. 1, Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 Declaration on Violence Against Women], available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.RES.48.104.En?Opend
ocument (last visited May 20, 2004).
14. See id. at art. 2 (stating violence in the family may include battery, sexual
abuse, and marital rape while violence in the general community may include rape,
sexual harassment at work, and trafficking in women).
15. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT VIENNA, CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, STRATEGIES FOR CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A
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Scholars have confirmed that “[g]ender-based violence, such as . . .
domestic violence, involves some form of physical assault or intrusion.
As a result, these forms of violence inherently violate the rights of
bodily integrity and security of the person.”16 However, others point
out that “extensive and continually expanding research literature
supports the assertion that domestic violence is associated with a wide
range of traumatic psychological reactions . . . .”17 It is important to
note that, for the purposes of this article, I will solely focus on legal
avenues available to women since the overwhelming majority of
domestic violence victims are adult females.18 There are situations,
though, where targeted victims could be young boys and girls as well
as elderly persons (male and female).19
II. THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES PERTAINING
TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A. The United Nations Campaign for Women’s Rights
As previously mentioned, the United Nations addressed the issue of
violence against women as part of its general ban on gender-based
discrimination.20 Shortly thereafter, the 1993 World Human Rights
RESOURCE MANUAL 6 (1993) [hereinafter U.N. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MANUAL].
16. SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 12, at 485.
17. Ela Grdinic, Application of the Elements of Torture and Other Forms of IllTreatment, as Defined by the European Court and Commission of Human Rights, to
the Incidents of Domestic Violence, 23 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 217, 232
(2000).
18. See WOMEN, LAW & DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL, STATE RESPONSES TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CURRENT STATUS AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS 1 (Rebecca P. Sewall
et al. eds., 1996); see also HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION
STRATEGIES: POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND LEGAL REMEDIES 102 (Albert R. Roberts ed.,
2002) (explaining from a U.S. perspective that “[d]emographic analyses of domestic
violence offenses reported to the police confirm the observation that domestic
violence is most frequently perpetrated by males against their female partners and
that males constitute only a small fraction of the total number of victims in domestic
violence cases”); see also Callie Marie Rennison, Intimate Partner Violence, 19932001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: CRIME DATA BRIEF, Feb. 2003, at 1 (reporting U.S.
Department of Justice statistics that, in 2001 alone, 85 percent of the victims of
intimate partner violence were women (588,490 crimes)), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf (last visited May 20, 2004).
19. See WOMEN, LAW & DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 18, at 1
(“Violence within the domestic arena takes many forms. Young boys may be victims
of sexual and physical abuse. Elderly family members and the infirm are equally
vulnerable and, in some cases, husbands are attacked by their wives.”). See generally
PHILIP W. COOK, ABUSED MEN: THE HIDDEN SIDE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1997)
(examining the neglected social issue of violence against men).
20. See EUROPEAN UNION, BREAKING THE SILENCE: EUROPEAN CAMPAIGN AGAINST
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 3 (2000) (aiming to advance victim protection, ensure preventive
measures, and improve available information and statistics on violence against
women); see also U.N. CHARTER, art. 55(c). See generally CEDAW, supra note 5
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Conference confirmed that women’s rights are human rights,21 and
states could then be held accountable for condoning and/or failing
to prevent domestic violence and, thus, failing to protect their female
citizens in general.22 A Platform for Action was established in 1995 at
the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China.23
The Beijing Declaration, which accompanied the 1995 Platform for
Action, solidified the world community’s resolve to, inter alia, “ensure
the full enjoyment by women and the girl child of all human rights
and fundamental freedoms, . . . take effective action against violations
of these rights and freedoms”24 and “[p]revent and eliminate all
forms of violence against women and girls.”25 The Platform for
Action identified violence against women as one of its critical areas of
concern,26 delineated the scope of its definition, which includes

(defining discrimination against women and taking measures to end such
discrimination including abolishing discriminatory laws, establishing tribunals to
ensure protection against discrimination, and ensuring equal access to political and
public life).
21. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on
Human Rights, ch. II, Pt. B. sec. 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?Ope
nDocument (last visited May 20, 2004) (“The World Conference on Human Rights
urges the full and equal enjoyment by women of all human rights and that this be a
priority for Governments and for the United Nations.”); see also id. (“The equal
status of women and the human rights of women should be integrated into the
mainstream of United Nations system-wide activity. These issues should be regularly
and systematically addressed throughout relevant United Nations bodies and
mechanisms.”).
22. See Barbara Stark, Domestic Violence and International Law: Good-Bye Earl
(Hans, Pedro, Gen, Chou, etc.), 47 LOY L. REV. 255, 262-65 (2001) [hereinafter Stark
1].
Historically, domestic violence was not viewed as a violation of women’s
human rights because it was not perpetuated by the state. Rather, it was
considered ‘private,’ ‘natural,’ or ‘cultural.’ International consciousness has
been raised in the last decade, however . . . . Now, a state’s acquiescence, or
failure to take effective measures to combat domestic violence, is recognized
as a violation of women’s human rights.
Id.
23. See Beijing Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.177/20, ch. 1 (1995), [hereinafter Platform for Action], available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/e5dplw.htm (last visited May 20, 2004)
(explaining that the Platform for Action “requires immediate and concerted action by
all to create a peaceful, just, humane and equitable world based on human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the principle of equality for all people of all ages
and from all walks of life” and that it “will require a strong commitment on the part of
Governments, international organizations and institutions at all levels”).
24. Id. at para. 23.
25. Id. at para. 29.
26. See id. at ch. 3, para. 46 (including additional critical areas of concern, such
as women in poverty, unequal access to education and healthcare, and discrimination
against the girl child).
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following

(b) Refrain from engaging in violence against women and exercise
due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with
national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether
those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons;
(c) Enact and/or reinforce penal, civil, labour and administrative
sanctions in domestic legislation to punish and redress the wrongs
done to women and girls who are subjected to any form of violence,
whether in the home, the workplace, the community or society;
(d) Adopt and/or implement and periodically review and analyse
legislation to ensure its effectiveness in eliminating violence against
women, emphasizing the prevention of violence and the
prosecution of offenders; take measures to ensure the protection of
women subjected to violence, access to just and effective remedies,
including compensation and indemnification and healing of
victims, and rehabilitation of perpetrators;
(e) Work actively to ratify and/or implement international human
rights norms and instruments as they relate to violence against
women, including those contained in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights . . . the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights . . . the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights . . . and the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
(f) Implement the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women . . . .
(h) Provide women who are subjected to violence with access to the
mechanisms of justice and, as provided for by national legislation,
to just and effective remedies for the harm they have suffered and
inform women of their rights in seeking redress through such
mechanisms . . . .28

The 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action were the first
steps towards showing a strong commitment, at the international
level, to combating violence against women (domestic violence
included).
In order to ensure that such commitment was maintained, the UN
General Assembly decided to convene a special session entitled
“Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the
Twenty-First Century,” better known as Beijing + 5.29 At this session,
27. See id. at ch. 4, para. 114(a) (encompassing violence that occurs in the family,
such as battery, sexual abuse, and marital rape).
28. Id. at ch. 4, para. 125.
29. See Beijing+5 Process and Beyond, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess. (2000) (reviewing
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member states adopted a Political Declaration30 and an Outcome
Document entitled “Further Actions and Initiatives to Implement the
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.”31
The Political
Declaration reaffirmed the goals of the 1995 Beijing Declaration and
Platform for Action, including the eradication of violence against
women (as well as domestic violence)32 and
pledg[ed] to undertake further action to ensure their full and
accelerated implementation, inter alia, through the promotion and
protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms,
mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and
programmes and promoting full participation and empowerment
of women and enhanced international cooperation for the full
implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action.33

The Outcome Document indicated that, while some progress had
been made since the 1995 Beijing conference, “barriers remain[ed]
and . . . the goals set and commitments made in Beijing need[ed] to
[be] implemented further.”34 With respect to violence against
women, the Outcome Document noted the following achievements
on the part of states:
There is increased awareness of and commitment to preventing and
combating violence against women and girls, including domestic
the progress of implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action),
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/bfbeyond.htm (last
visited May 20, 2004). The special General Assembly session was held on June 5-9,
2000. Id.
30. See Political Declaration, G.A. Res. S-32/2, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Special Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-23/2 (2000) [hereinafter Political Declaration] (reaffirming
commitment to goal and objectives of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action as well as the implementation of the Platform for Action’s critical areas of
concern), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/ress232e.pdf
(last visited May 20, 2004).
31. See Further Actions and Initiatives to Implement the Beijing Declaration and
Platform of Action, G.A. Res. S-23/2, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Special Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/S-23/3 (2000) [hereinafter Outcome Document] (detailing achievements
and obstacles in critical areas of concern, including women and poverty, education of
women,
health,
and
violence
against
women),
available
at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/ress233e.pdf (last visited May 20,
2004).
32. See Political Declaration, supra note 30, paras. 1-2.
33. Id. at para. 8; see also Report of the Secretary-General: Implementation of the
Outcome of the Fourth World Conference on Women and of the Special Session of
the General Assembly entitled “Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and
Peace for the Twenty-first Century”, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/55/341
(2000) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary General], available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/ungass.pdf (last visited May 20,
2004) for a subsequent report issued by the UN Secretary General providing more indepth analysis of the Political Declaration, its implementation and follow-up.
34. Outcome Document, supra note 31, at 2-3. See generally Report of the
Secretary General, supra note 33.
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violence, which violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment of
their human rights and fundamental freedoms, through, inter alia,
improved legislation, policies and programmes. Governments have
initiated policy reforms and mechanisms, such as interdepartmental
committees, guidelines and protocols, national, multidisciplinary
and coordinated programmes to address violence.
Some
Governments have also introduced or reformed laws to protect
women and girls from all forms of violence and laws to prosecute
the perpetrators . . . . Some progress has been made in the
provision of services for abused women and children, including
legal services, shelters, special health services and counselling,
hotlines and police units with special training. Education for law
enforcement personnel, members of the judiciary, health-care
providers and welfare workers is being promoted. Educational
materials for women and public awareness campaigns have been
developed as well as research on the root causes of violence . . . .
Successful cooperation has been achieved between governmental
and non-governmental organizations in the field of preventing
violence against women.35

Having delineated some of the accomplishments in the campaign
to eradicate violence against women, the Outcome Document stressed
that women were still victims of various forms of abuse and domestic
violence, in particular, that had not been effectively addressed:
Inadequate understanding of the root causes of all forms of
violence against women and girls hinders efforts to eliminate
violence against women and girls. There is a lack of comprehensive
programmes dealing with the perpetrators, including programmes,
where appropriate, which would enable them to solve problems
without violence. Inadequate data on violence further impedes
informed policy-making and analysis. Socio-cultural attitudes which
are discriminatory and economic inequalities reinforce women’s
subordinate place in society. This makes women and girls
vulnerable to many forms of violence, such as physical, sexual and
psychological violence occurring in the family, including
battering. . . . Domestic violence, including sexual violence in
marriage, is still treated as a private matter in some countries.
Insufficient awareness of the consequences of domestic violence,
how to prevent it and the rights of victims still exists. Although
improving, the legal and legislative measures, especially in the
criminal justice area, to eliminate different forms of violence
against women and children, including domestic violence . . . are

35. Outcome Document, supra note 31, at 6.
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weak in many countries.
Prevention strategies also remain
fragmented and reactive and there is a lack of programmes on
these issues.36

These limitations, described during the Beijing + 5 conference in
June 2000, are still prevalent today and, while declarations and
international conferences are pertinent venues for pointing out such
issues of wide concern and for suggesting solutions,37 they do not
create binding obligations that require states to enforce these
solutions. The 1995 Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action
as well as the 2000 Political Declaration and Outcome Document
carry political weight but they are not, on their own, legally binding
instruments,38 unless they are seen as embodying notions of
customary human rights law, which has a legally binding effect upon
states.39
B. The International Bill of Human Rights
There are, however, other international documents, which
delineate broader human rights categories and which have more
force than declarations as far as their legally binding nature is
concerned.
The United Nations has recognized that the
International Bill of Human Rights, comprised of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”),40 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)41 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

36. Id. at 7.
37. See id. at 17-42 (suggesting various actions to be undertaken at the national
and international level in order to address women’s issues, including violence against
women and domestic violence). Such measures include enacting effective legislation
to protect women and girls from all forms of violence, prosecuting perpetrators of
violence against women, and treating all violence against women as criminal offenses.
Id.
38. See INTERNATIONAL LAW 847 (Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble eds., 3rd
ed. 1999).
[T]here are a great number of international declarations . . . relevant to
international human rights that have been adopted by the UN or by other
international organizations or conferences. While these instruments are not
directly binding in a legal sense, they establish broadly recognized standards
and are frequently invoked in connection with human rights issues.
Id.
39. See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 319 (1999) (stating that customary
human rights law is slightly different from customary international law); see also infra
Part II.E (discussing the incorporation of domestic violence norms within customary
international law).
40. See generally UDHR, supra note 2.
41. See generally ICCPR, supra note 3.
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(“ICESCR”),42 provides for fundamental human rights, which, in
turn, are “general rights for victims of domestic violence.”43 The
following is a closer analysis of each of the aforementioned
international human rights documents with a focus on particular
provisions that could be invoked in connection with domestic
violence situations. It should be noted that not all of the analyzed
provisions would be applicable in all instances since there is always the
possibility that a State Party has signed/ratified legally binding
international documents, such as the ICCPR and the ICESCR, with
reservations to certain provisions.44
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)
Former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women Radhika Coomaraswamy indicated that the “fundamental
human rights to be free from torture, gender discrimination and the
inherent right to life are directly applicable to . . . violence against
women” (domestic violence included).45 These rights, in addition to
being well established within customary international law, are
specifically delineated within the UDHR. The UDHR sets the tone for
gender equality and the fundamental right to be free from genderbased discrimination, which, in turn, is the broad basis for domestic
violence standards worldwide. UDHR signatories pledge to recognize
that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights.”46 Furthermore “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in [the UDHR], without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property or other status.”47 The
UDHR also acknowledges that “[e]veryone has the right to
recognition everywhere as a person before the law”48 and that “all are
42. See generally ICESCR, supra note 4.
43. See U.N. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MANUAL, supra note 15, at 1 (noting that basic
human rights encompass the right to a safe domestic environment).
44. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 336-37 (permitting states to sign treaties with reservations, except when
the treaty prohibits reservations or when the reservation contradicts the purpose of
the treaty). Theoretically, the law on reservations is the same whether the instrument
in question is a traditional international treaty or a human rights treaty. However,
some have questioned the effectiveness of reservations within the human rights
context where documents express generally accepted principles. See HENKIN, supra
note 39, at 308-10.
45. Violence Against Women, Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. Economic
and Social Council, para. 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 (1998).
46. UDHR, supra note 2, at art. 1.
47. Id. at art. 2.
48. Id. at art. 6.
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equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
equal protection of the law . . . .”49 In addition, the UDHR sets the
premise for the right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment, which is key for domestic violence victims.50
The UDHR also designates the inherent “right to life, liberty and the
security of person” to every individual;51another crucial right for
women who have been subjected to domestic violence. Lastly, the
UDHR ensures that both men and women have the equal right to
physical and mental health.52 However, as noted above, declarations
like the UDHR, are not legally binding unless they are seen as part of
customary international law.53 Some scholars argue further that, the
UDHR, in particular, has a legally binding effect on all United
Nations members since it is “an authoritative interpretation of the
general human rights commitments contained in the [United
Nations] Charter.”54
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)
Fundamental human rights, such as the right to life, the right to be
free from torture and the right to be free from gender discrimination
that can refer directly to violence against women, are also delineated
in the ICCPR, which entered into force on March 23, 1976.55 Article
7 of the ICCPR states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”56 The right
to life, belonging to both men and women, is inscribed in the first
paragraph of Article 6: “[e]very human being has the inherent right
to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be

49. Id. at art. 7 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at art. 5.
51. Id. at art. 3.
52. See id. at art. 25, para. 1.
53. See INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38, at 262 (noting scholars’ recognition
of the UDHR as “binding, customary international law”); see also id. at 848 (“One oftstated argument is that at least some standards set by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, although initially only recommendatory and nonbinding, have now
become legally binding as customary law through their wide acceptance by nations as
having normative effect.”).
54. Id. at 848.
55. See ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 49, para. 1 (“The present Covenant shall
enter into force three months after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of
accession.”); see also Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human
Rights Treaties (listing the States which have signed and/or ratified various U.N.
treaties including the ICCPR), at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited
May 20, 2004).
56. ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 7.
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arbitrarily deprived of his life.”57 Gender equality and the right to be
free from gender-based discrimination appear within several
provisions of the ICCPR depending upon the scope of its application:
Article 2(1): Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status . . . .
Article 14(1): All persons shall be equal before the courts and
tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him,
or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a compact, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law . . . .
Article 16: Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere
as a person before the law.
Article 23(4): States Parties to the present Covenant shall take
appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of
spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution . . . .
Article 26: All persons are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In
this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.58

Furthermore, the ICCPR guarantees, to all persons, the right to
effective legal protections and remedies.59 Some scholars have
concluded that certain States Parties have violated this right by
impeding upon the ability of domestic violence victims to access the
court system.60
High standards of proof, strict evidentiary
requirements and unresponsiveness on the part of police are all
obstacles that battered women continuously encounter.61 If a State
57. Id. at art. 6, para. 1.
58. See id. at art. 2, para. 1; art. 14, para. 1; art. 16; art. 23, para. 4; art. 26.
59. See id. at art. 26 (“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.”).
60. See SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 12, at 487.
61. See id. Scholars have found that:
In many countries around the world, women victims of domestic violence
may not be able to document their injuries adequately due to onerous rules
of evidence in court . . . . For example, in Macedonia, women seeking to
prosecute their batterers must obtain medical documentation of their
injuries, which can cost as much as a month’s salary. . . . These rules deny
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Party allows for such obstacles, it violates its ICCPR obligations.62
The ICCPR is a legally binding document upon the states that have
signed it and/or ratified it by passing domestic legislation.63 Article 2,
paragraph 1 imposes affirmative obligations upon states not only to
respect the rights delineated within the ICCPR, but also to ensure that
those rights are protected through national law.64
Article 2,
paragraphs 2 and 3 confirm that these affirmative obligations require
States Parties to frame their legal system in such a manner as to
ensure the protection of human rights and to provide for an effective
remedy in cases where those rights have been impeded upon.65 If a
State Party fails to fulfill its affirmative obligations, individual citizens
are entitled, under the 1966 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,66 to file
women an effective remedy by preventing the prosecution of crimes of
violence against women. In some countries, rules of evidence discount the
testimony of women. In Pakistan, for example, Article 17 of the Qanun-eShahadat Order of 1984 (Law of Evidence Order) diminishes the weight of
women’s testimony in some circumstances to that of half of a man’s
testimony. . . . The Qanun-e-Shahadat Order also allows for the admission of
evidence to show that the victim was ‘immoral.’ . . . . In many countries,
police refuse to respond to calls relating to domestic violence or to
investigate assault claims when they discover the victim and the perpetrator of
the assault are related. Even if the police investigate and file a report,
prosecutors often do not pursue the cases. In some instances, when a woman
successfully maneuvers through the criminal justice system to have her case
heard before a judge, the judge dismisses the case or imposes only a nominal
fine. For example, in Albania, a woman who attempts to prosecute a
domestic assault meets with extreme resistance at each step of the criminal
justice system. The police, prosecutors, and judges view their role as
facilitating reconciliation, and they pressure women to ‘pardon’ their
husbands. . . .
Id.
62. See ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 26.
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 cmt. h (2002).
Depending upon the manner in which international treaties become binding in each
country. In the case of the United States, for example, it is up to the state “to decide
how it will carry out its international obligations. Accordingly, the intention of the
United States determines whether an agreement is to be self-executing in the United
States or should await implementation by legislation or appropriate executive or
administrative action.” Id.
64. See ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 2, para. 1; see also HENKIN, supra note 39, at
489 (construing the Covenant’s language to mandate affirmative action by States
Parties to protect the relevant rights).
65. See ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 2, paras. 2 & 3.
66. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. I, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b4ccprp1.htm (last visited May 18, 2004).
A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present Protocol
recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be
victims of a violation by the State Party of any of the rights set forth in the
Covenant. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it
concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a Party to the present
Protocol.
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complaints with the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”), the
monitoring body of the ICCPR,67 who, in turn, will issue an advisory
opinion, or a “view,” to the violating State Party. The State Party,
then, has the “option” to follow the recommendations of the HRC by
employing its domestic enforcement mechanisms in order to protect
the rights asserted by the complainants.68 The State Party’s progress
is monitored by a Special Rapporteur, whose main function is to
follow-up with the implementation of the HRC’s views.69 Thus, a
domestic violence victim, who has exhausted all of her domestic
remedies, can file a complaint with the HRC asserting her right to be
free from torture, her right to be free from gender discrimination,
her inherent right to life and her right to an effective legal remedy
(depending upon her situation) and the HRC will, in turn, issue an
opinion, or view, recommending that her state of citizenship employ
effective means of protecting and ensuring the asserted rights.70
Then, it is the responsibility of her state of citizenship to implement
the HRC’s recommendations under the watchful eye of the Special
Rapporteur.
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”)
The ICESCR can also provide protection for victims of domestic

Id.
67. See ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 28 (establishing the Human Rights
Committee (“HRC”)).
68. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 491-92. The Human Rights Committee
may be described as the guardian of the [ICCPR], with responsibility for
monitoring its implementation. Its two main functions . . . are to consider
reports from, and complaints against, the State Parties. The former is
obligatory for all State Parties, while the latter is optional and exists in two
forms: interstate ‘communications’ under the Covenant, as well as individual
‘communications’ under the Optional Protocol. The basic obligation of
States Parties is to implement the rights provided for in Parts I and III of the
[ICCPR].
Id.
69. See, e.g., Annual Report of the Human Rights Committee: Volume I, U.N.
Human Rights Committee, 70th-72nd Sess., at 131, U.N. Doc. A/56/40 (2001)
(articulating the responsibilities of the Special Rapporteur, while conceding that
financial difficulties prevented the initiation of follow up visits), available at
http:www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/a91dea9af2c00fa7c1256ace0055cab5?Op
endocument (last visited May 18, 2004).
70. Unfortunately, thus far, there are no HRC advisory opinions interpreting the
relevant ICCPR articles in connection with specific domestic violence situations. See
United Nations Documents By Treaty (revealing the dearth of the HRC advisory
opinions interpreting the relevant ICCPR articles in connection with specific
domestic violence situations), at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (last visited May
18, 2004).
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violence.71 However, it should be noted that the ICESCR is more
often used to uphold women’s economic, social and cultural rights.72
While not as widely invoked in situations involving violence against
women, one could still argue that certain ICESCR provisions are
applicable to specific instances of violence within the home,
depending upon the circumstances.
For example, Article 12,
paragraph 1 indicates that “States Parties to the [ICESCR] recognize
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health.”73 If we follow our initial
definition of domestic violence from above74 coupled with the
ICESCR’s guarantee against gender-based discrimination,75 Article 12
could be read to impose an obligation upon States Parties to protect
women’s physical and mental health and provide for domestic
remedies when their health is in peril (i.e. when their partners are
batterers). Since the ICESCR seeks to provide rights for both sexes
equally, battered women are entitled to protection under Article 12.
The ICESCR can also be read in conjunction with the ICCPR in
order to ensure that victims of domestic violence have proper access
to legal redress. Amnesty International points out that:
Women may not be able to obtain redress for abuses . . . because
[they] are deprived of their economic, social and cultural rights.
Economic dependence and inadequate welfare provision in many
parts of the world force women to bear continued abuse. Abused
women often have nowhere to go, no money to sustain themselves
71. The ICESCR entered into force on January 3, 1976. See ICESCR, supra note
4, at art. 27, para. 1 (“The present Covenant shall enter into force three months after
the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the thirtyfifth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.”); see also United Nations
Documents By Treaty, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited
May 18, 2004).
72. See generally Barbara Stark, The International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights as a Resource for Women, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 209-243 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2000)
[hereinafter Stark 2] (reviewing the creation of the ICESCR, its valuation of
“nurturing work” often performed by women, its protection of families, its provision
of educational rights, and its incorporation of women into the international legal
arena).
73. ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 12, para. 1 (emphasis added).
74. See supra Part I. (defining domestic violence as acts or threats of genderbased violence that causes or will likely cause physical, sexual or psychological trauma
within the home).
75. See ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 2, para. 2 (“The States Parties to the present
Covenant undertake to guarantee that the right enunciated in the present Covenant
will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.”); see also id. at art. 3 (“the States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social
and cultural changes set forth in the present Covenant.”).
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or their children, and no funds to seek legal counsel in order to
pursue redress. Legal aid is often not available to abused women.
Social and economic deprivation go hand in hand with ignorance
of legal rights and the criminal justice process, so women are often
unaware of their alternatives.76

The guarantee to provide both men and women with equal
“enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth” in the
ICESCR,77 including the right to work78 and the right to earn “a
decent living for themselves and their families,”79 together with the
ICCPR’s obligation to provide effective legal protections and remedies
to all,80 address the economic and social dilemmas that battered
women face as well as their inability to access the legal system. Thus,
an argument can be made that a victim of domestic violence should
be able to hold a State Party, to both the ICESCR and the ICCPR,
responsible for not sustaining her economic and social viability, thus,
in turn, preventing her from reaching the legal system in order to
obtain redress and protection from her violent partner.
The ICESCR is monitored by the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) and has a legally binding effect upon
states that have signed and/or ratified it.81 However the affirmative
obligations of States Parties to the ICESCR are phrased differently
than those of States Parties to the ICCPR. Under the ICESCR:
[e]ach State Party . . . undertakes to take steps, individually and
through international assistance and co-operation, especially
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources,
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means,
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.82

Many scholars are skeptical about the language allowing states to
“take steps . . . to the maximum of [their] available sources . . . with a
view to achieve progressively . . . .” because such language is vague and
undermines the states’ affirmative obligation under the ICESCR.83
76. AI 2000 REPORT, supra note 1, at 37.
77. ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 3. See also id. at art. 2, para. 2 (setting forth the
principle of non-discrimination).
78. See id. at art. 6, para. 1 (acknowledging the rights to independently select an
occupation).
79. Id. at art. 7(a)(ii).
80. See ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 26.
81. Depending upon the manner in which international treaties become binding
within each country. See, e.g., supra note 63.
82. ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 2, para. 1.
83. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 518 (questioning the extent of States Parties’
responsibilities regarding the ICESCR).
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The CESCR issued a general comment in 1990 in order to specifically
address the nature of States Parties’ obligations under Article 2,
paragraph 1 of the Covenant;84 however, enforceability remains a
problem with the ICESCR.85 Thus, a domestic violence victim would
benefit more from invoking the ICCPR and other international
treaties focused specifically on women’s rights, such as CEDAW, than
raising an argument solely under the ICESCR.
C. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (“CEDAW”), Its Optional Protocol and the 1993
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women
The 1967 Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women acknowledged the lack of international protection of
women’s rights in particular86 and was a precursor to CEDAW, which
entered into force on September 3, 1981.87 CEDAW does not
explicitly prohibit violence against women, which encompasses
domestic violence. However, the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW Committee”) has
incorporated gender-based violence within CEDAW’s general ban on
gender-based discrimination.88 In its General Recommendation No.
84. See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Reporting by States
Parties: CESCR General Comment 3 (1989) (explaining that States Parties must take
“deliberate, concrete, and targeted” action to achieve covenant goals, including
legislative, judicial, administrative, economic, educational, and cultural action),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (last visited May 18, 2004).
85. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 518-19 (observing that the vague language used
to describe States Parties’ responsibilities to the ICESCR may permit States Parties to
evade their obligations).
86. See Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A.
Res.
2263(XXII),
U.N.
GAOR,
22nd
Sess.,
(1967),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/21.htm (last visited May 20, 2004).
Concerned that, despite the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights
and other instruments of the United Nations and the specialized agencies
and despite the progress made in the matter of equality of rights, there
continues to exist considerable discrimination against women . . . .
Id.
87. See CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 27, para. 1 (“[t]he present Convention shall
enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of ratification or
accession.”); see also Division for the Advancement of Women, States Parties to
CEDAW, at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last visited
May 20, 2004); see also Status of Ratification of the Principal International Human
Rights Treaties (Dec. 9, 2000) at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited
May 20, 2004).
88. See CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 2 (describing CEDAW signatories’ resolve to
“condemn discrimination against women in all its forms”); see also Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Violence Against Women: CEDAW General
Recommendation No. 19, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992) [hereinafter CEDAW
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19, the CEDAW Committee explains the following:
The Convention in article 1 defines discrimination against women.
The definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence,
that is, violence that is directed against a woman because she is a
woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts
that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of
such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. Gender-based
violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention,
regardless of whether those provisions expressly mention
violence.89

Thus, when analyzing CEDAW in order to find protections for a
victim of domestic violence, which is a form of violence against
women, one can use and interpret various articles even though such
articles do not explicitly address violence.
Article 2(e) of CEDAW requires its signatories and/or ratifiers90
“[t]o take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women by any person, organization or enterprise,”91 which
the CEDAW Committee interpreted as the basis for holding states
responsible for failing to prevent, investigate and punish acts of
violence perpetrated by private citizens against women.92
Gen. Rec. 19] (“Gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously
inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with
men.”),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/
300395546e0dec52c12563ee0063dc9d?OpenDocument (last visited May 20, 2004).
89. See CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 88, at para. 6; see also CEDAW, supra
note 5, at art. 1.
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘discrimination against
women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis
of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any
other field.
Id.
90. Depending upon the manner in which international treaties become
binding within each country. See, e.g., supra note 63.
91. See CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 2(e) (emphasis added).
92. See Stark 1, supra note 22, at 269-70 (explaining that states may be held
responsible for private acts if they fail to take reasonable steps to prevent the
discriminatory acts or fail to investigate and punish acts of violence). According to
the CEDAW Committee,
discrimination under the Convention is not restricted to action by or on
behalf of Governments . . . . For example, under article 2(e) the Convention
calls on State parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise.
Under general international law and specific human rights covenants, States
may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to
prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and
for providing compensation.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2004

19

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 3
VESA.DOC

328

9/10/2004 4:59 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 12:2

Furthermore, CEDAW’s Article 3 specifies that:
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political,
social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures,
including legislation, to ensure the full development and
advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental
freedoms on a basis of equality with men.93

Lastly, Article 12, paragraph 1 of CEDAW ensures that both men
and women have an equal right to physical and mental health and
indicates that women should have equal access to health care
services.94 Thus, one could argue that a woman who is a victim of
domestic violence, whose health is in danger and who cannot receive
adequate medical attention, can seek protection under CEDAW by
holding her state of citizenship responsible for not implementing
legislation or other measures that would have prevented her partner
from physically abusing her, for failing to investigate and punish her
partner who has committed domestic violence and for not providing
the appropriate avenues to access health care.
Other CEDAW provisions pave the way for further arguments that
can be made on behalf of domestic violence victims. The CEDAW
Committee points out that traditional views regarding women as
being subordinate to men fuel violence against women (domestic
violence included). “Such prejudices and practices may justify
gender-based violence as a form of protection or control of women.
The effect of such violence on the physical and mental integrity of
women is to deprive them of the equal enjoyment, exercise and
knowledge of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”95 Article
2(f) of CEDAW requires States Parties “[t]o take all appropriate
measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination
against women.”96 Article 5(a) compels states:
[t]o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view of achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of
the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women.”97
CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 88, at para. 9.
93. See CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 3.
94. See id. at art. 12, para. 1 (explaining that women should have access to
medical services including those related to family planning).
95. See CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 88, at para. 11.
96. See CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 2(f).
97. See id. at art. 5(a).
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Article 10(c) indicates that States Parties are to ensure that such
gender stereotypes are eliminated from the education system.98
Article 14 of CEDAW focuses on empowering women in rural areas
and ensuring their equal access to various social services including
adequate health care.99 The CEDAW Committee explains that
“[r]ural women are at risk of gender-based violence because
traditional attitudes regarding the subordinate role of women . . .
persist in many rural communities . . . .”100 Lastly, Article 5(a),
described above, can be read in conjunction with Article 16, which
aims at eliminating discrimination against women in all family and
marriage related matters,101 as a prohibition of domestic violence.
The CEDAW Committee indicates that:
Family violence is one of the most insidious forms of violence
against women. It is prevalent in all societies. Within family
relationships women of all ages are subjected to violence of all
kinds, including battering, rape, other forms of sexual assault,
mental and other forms of violence, which are perpetuated by
traditional attitudes. Lack of economic independence forces many
women to stay in violent relationships. The abrogation of their
family responsibilities by men can be a form of violence, and
coercion. These forms of violence put women’s health at risk and
impair their ability to participate in family life and public life on a
basis of equality.102

Thus, a victim of domestic violence can hold her state of citizenship
responsible for failing to uphold its obligations under the
aforementioned CEDAW articles if she can prove that the state has
not implemented adequate means to eradicate traditional views and
customs regarding the subordination of women to men from its
legislation, social structure or education system. She can argue that
the state has allowed such prejudices to thrive, thus, fueling violence
against women in general as well as violence within the home. When
analyzing the applicability of certain CEDAW provisions to individual
domestic violence situations, though, one must take into

98. See id. at art. 10(c) (recommending co-education and the modification of
textbook and school programs).
99. See id. at art. 14.
100. See CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 88, at para. 21.
101. See CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 5(a) (stating that states should try to
“modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women” in order to
eliminate common prejudices and the stereotyped roles of men and women); see id.
at art. 16 (stating that States should take steps to ensure that women have equal rights
to men within the institution of marriage).
102. See CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 88, at para. 23.
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consideration any reservations that a particular State Party might have
entered when it signed/ratified this treaty.103
Following CEDAW’s entry into force,104 the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993.105
In this
declaration, the term “violence against women” was defined more
precisely since CEDAW itself focuses on the broader notion of
“discrimination against women.” The declaration clarifies that “the
term ‘violence against women’ means any act of gender-based
violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in
public or in private life.”106 Furthermore Article 2 of the declaration
indicates that the following types of abuse constitute violence against
women:
Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family,
including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the
household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital
mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, nonspousal violence and violence related to exploitation;
Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the
general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual
harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions
and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution;
Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or
condoned by the State, wherever it occurs.107

Article 3 of the declaration reiterates the rights of battered women,
which have been articulated in various other international human
rights instruments:
103. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (stating that parties may make a reservation to the treaty, as long as that
reservation is not prohibited by the treaty or violates the purpose of the treaty),
available at http:www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/viennaconvention.html (last
visited May 20, 2004); see also CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 28, paras. 1-2 (“(1) The
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all States the
text of reservations made by States at the time of ratification or accession. (2) A
reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall
not be permitted.”).
104. See CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 23, para. 1 (stating that CEDAW would
enter into force “on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit with the Secretary
General of the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of ratification or
accession”). CEDAW entered into force on September 3, 1981.
105. See generally 1993 Declaration on Violence Against Women, supra note 13.
106. Id. at art. 1.
107. Id. at art. 2 (emphasis added).
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Women are entitled to the equal enjoyment and protection of all
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. These rights
include, inter alia:
The right to life;
The right to equality;
The right to liberty and security of person;
The right to equal protection under the law;
The right to be free from all forms of discrimination;
The right to the highest standard attainable of physical and mental
health;
The right to just and favourable conditions of work;
The right not to be subjected to torture, or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.108

Lastly, Article 4(c) imposes a duty upon states to “[e]xercise due
diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national
legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts
are perpetrated by the State or by private persons.”109 This “due
diligence” standard is a critical element for dealing with situations of
domestic violence because it clarifies the misconception that a state
can dodge its responsibilities simply because the perpetrator of the
violence was a private actor, thus, outside the scope of the state’s
authority, or that such violence is justified by existing social or cultural
traditions.110 While the declaration encourages signatory states to
abide by the obligations delineated in CEDAW, to condemn violence
against women and to refrain from “invok[ing] any custom, tradition
or religious consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its
elimination,”111 it is not a legally binding document on its own.
Perhaps if taken in conjunction with CEDAW or if seen as part of

108. Id. at art. 3.
109. Id. at art. 4(c) (emphasis added).
110. Amnesty International, Respect, Protect, Fulfill- Women’s Human Rights:
State Responsibility for Abuses by ‘Non-State Actors,’ 5 (2000) (“[t]he concept of due
diligence is a way to describe the threshold of action and effort which a state must
demonstrate to fulfill its responsibility to protect individuals from abuses of their
rights”), at http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGIOR500012000 (last visited
May 18, 2004).
“A state cannot, for example, avoid responsibility for the
mistreatment of domestic workers by arguing that the abuse took place in the privacy
of the employer’s home, or that it is justified by social or cultural practices.” Id.
111. 1993 Declaration on Violence Against Women, supra note 13, at art. 4.
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customary law,112 one could argue that the aspirations and definitions
delineated in the declaration have a binding effect upon states.
Until recently, enforcement of CEDAW was weak.113 On December
22, 2000, an Optional Protocol entered into force,114 which
strengthened CEDAW’s means of enforcement and which can be used
as an important tool to ensure that states protect individual victims by
undertaking measures to prevent domestic violence. The protocol
provides for two new mechanisms to hold States Parties accountable
for their CEDAW obligations:
1) the communications procedure, which provides individuals and
groups the right to lodge complaints with the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women . . . regarding
violations of the terms of the Convention by State Parties and 2) the
inquiry procedure, which enables CEDAW to conduct inquiries into
serious and systematic abuses of women’s human rights within State
Parties.115

Consequently, a domestic violence victim, after exhausting her
domestic remedies, can file a communication with the CEDAW
Committee, thus, lodging a grievance against her state of citizenship
for failing to protect her right against gender-based abuse, as well as
any other applicable right expressed in CEDAW, and for failing to
undertake measures to prevent domestic violence.116 In turn, the
112. See INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38, at 848 (explaining that there are
many non-binding international human rights declarations that “establish broadly
recognized standards and are frequently invoked in connection with human rights
issues”). See generally infra Part II.E (discussing the incorporation of domestic
violence standards into customary international law).
113. See Laboni Amena Hoq, Note, The Women’s Convention and Its Optional
Protocol: Empowering Women to Claim Their Internationally Protected Rights, 32
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 677, 684 (2001) (observing that before the adoption of the
Optional Protocol, the Convention included only two enforcement mechanisms: the
interstate procedure and the reporting procedure); see also Dame Silvia Cartwright,
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, in 2 WOMEN
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 165, 179 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig
eds., 2000) (explaining that CEDAW lacked a mechanism for individual complaint
procedures prior to the adoption of the Optional Protocol).
114. See CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 16, para. 1 (“The present
Protocol shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the tenth instrument of ratification or
accession.”); see also UNITED NATIONS, SIGNATURES TO AND RATIFICATIONS OF THE
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL (Apr. 16, 2003), at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/
cedaw/sigop.htm (last visited May 18, 2004).
115. Hoq, supra note 113, at 678.
116. See CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 2 (“Communications may
be submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, under the
jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the rights
set forth in the Convention by that State Party.”); see also id. at pmbl. (“Reaffirming
[the] determination [of States Parties] to ensure the full and equal enjoyment by
women of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and to take effective action to
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CEDAW Committee issues recommendations, or “views,” sharing
them with all parties involved, including the state in question.117
Furthermore, the CEDAW Committee can now investigate situations
in which a particular state has consistently violated CEDAW protected
rights and has frequently failed to curtail domestic violence within its
territory.118
D. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”)
The CAT, which entered into force on June 26, 1987, establishes a
complete ban on any form of torture or other inhuman or degrading
treatment.119 The CAT defines torture as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity.120

The former UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women,
Radhika Coomaraswamy,121 various scholars,122 non-governmental
organizations, such as members of the World Organisation Against
and Amnesty International,124 have all
Torture (“WOAT”)123
prevent violations of these rights and freedoms.”).
117. Id. at art. 7, para. 3.
118. See id. at art. 8 (stating that the Committee may conduct an inquiry into a
state’s actions, which may include a visit to that state). The Committee will then
submit its findings to the state, which has six months to respond. Id.
119. See CAT, supra note 7, at art. 27, para. 1 (“This Convention shall enter into
force on the thirtieth day after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.”); see also
Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited May 18, 2004).
120. See CAT, supra note 7, at art. 1, para. 1.
121. See Stark 1, supra note 22, at 270.
122. See id.; see also Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday:
Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 296 (1994)
(“[W]hen stripped of privatization, sexism and sentimentality, private gender-based
violence is no less grave than other forms of inhumane and subordinating official
violence that have been prohibited by treaty and customary law and recognized by the
international community as jus cogens, or preemptory norms.”); see also Grdinic,
supra note 17, at 259 (asserting that domestic violence could represent torture under
the European Convention on Human Rights).
123. See generally The World Organisation Against Torture (providing
information about the “largest international coalition of NGOs fighting against
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concluded that, in certain circumstances, domestic violence could
qualify as torture. The WOAT associates private forms of torture, like
domestic violence, with public forms of torture. “[J]ust as torture by a
state official typically takes place when the victim is in
incommunicado detention, at the unsupervised mercy of his
interrogators or captors and without access to the outside world,
battered women, because of their domestic situation, live isolated
from family and friends and others.”125
Amnesty International indicates that “[t]he severity of harm
inflicted upon women by private individuals can be just as damaging
as that inflicted on women who are tortured by agents of the state,”
and that, in both cases, abuses are intentionally inflicted.126
Furthermore, “[t]orture in custody is often used not only to extract
confessions but also to instill profound dread into victims, to break
their will, to punish them and to demonstrate the power of the
perpetrators. Similar purposes characterize acts of torture in the
family or the community.”127 Amnesty International interprets CAT
to impose responsibility upon states to not comply, consent or
acquiesce in128 such private forms of torture as well as “to exercise due
diligence and to provide equal protection in preventing and
punishing such abuses by private individuals.”129

torture, summary executions, forced disappearances and all other forms of cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment”), at http://www.omct.org (last visited May 18,
2004).
124. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (“When states
fail to take the basic steps needed to protect women from domestic violence or allow
these crimes to be committed with impunity, states are failing in their obligation to
protect women from torture.”), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
stopviolence/factsheets/violence.html (last visited May 18, 2004).
125. CARIN BENNINGER-BUDEL & ANNE-LAURENCE LACROIX, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: A REPORT 43 (1999). While WOAT parallels violence within the home with
torture at the hand of public officials, others disagree:
Conceived by its promoters and drafters primarily as a response to the use of
state violence against citizens . . . the [Torture] Convention accordingly
focus[es] on the actions of public officials and the state’s responsibility for
them. . . . There is no doubt that the Convention, in its adherence to fairly
traditional international law paradigms of state responsibility, does exclude
from its coverage many types of violations of the rights to physical and mental
integrity of women, and that violence in the family is largely (if not
completely) untouched by its provisions.
Andrew Byrnes, The Convention Against Torture, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 183 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., Transnational
Publishers, Inc. 2000).
126. AI 2000 REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
127. Id.
128. See CAT, supra note 7, at art. 1, para. 1.
129. AI 2000 REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
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Professor Rhonda Copelon found striking similarities between the
elements of torture listed in Article 1 of CAT and aspects of domestic
violence: physical and psychological pain are present in both
instances,130 the general intent required in torture cases is also often
present in episodes of domestic violence when abusers plan their
attacks upon women,131 and pain is inflicted with a specific purpose
in mind in both situations.132 Professor Copelon explains that while
in cases of torture state involvement must be established, such a
requirement is not the sine qua non of the definition of torture as a
human rights violation.133 That is, violence inflicted by anyone, a
public official or a private citizen, could amount to torture.134
Consequently, under CAT, States’ Parties are not only obligated to
protect citizens who are subjected to torture at the hand of public
officials, but could also be obligated to protect victims of domestic
violence who are subjected to certain grave abuses by their
partners.135 According to CAT, states are responsible to investigate,
prosecute and extradite individuals suspected of torture.136 The same
obligations can be imposed in cases where domestic violence amounts
to torture. CAT dictates that states should avert the possibility of
situations where torture might arise by ensuring that law enforcement
personnel are properly trained and reviewed.137 The same training
and review can prove to be helpful in instances of domestic violence.
Furthermore, States’ Parties to CAT are required to investigate
complaints as well as provide legal remedies and compensation when

130. See Copelon, supra note 122, at 311-19 (describing various methods of abuse,
including beating, burning, raping, starving, depriving of sleep, and threatening the
victim or the victim’s family or friends).
131. See id. at 327 (observing that male batterers plan their abuse).
132. See id. at 329-41 (detailing purposes such as eliciting information,
punishment, intimidation, discrimination, destruction of personality, and reduction
of capacities).
133. See id. at 341-52.
134. See id.
135. See AI 2000 REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 (“States have a duty under
international law to take positive measures to prohibit and prevent torture and to
respond to instances of torture, regardless of whether the torture takes place and
whether the perpetrator is an agent of the state or a private individual.”); see also
Amnesty International, End Domestic Violence. End Torture. A Fact Sheet on
Domestic Violence as Torture, at 1 (“Acts of violence against women [including
domestic violence] constitute torture when they are of the nature and severity
envisaged by the concept of torture and the state has failed to provide effective
protection.”) [on file with the author].
136. CAT, supra note 7, at arts. 4-9.
137. See id. at arts. 10-11 (requiring training and periodic review of police,
doctors, public officials, and others who exercise control over, question, or treat
detainees and arrested individuals).
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allegations of torture have been proven.138 The same requirements
can apply in situations where domestic violence is deemed to be
torture under CAT.
States that fail to address domestic violence can be held responsible
under CAT for having “consented” to or “acquiesced” in such
behavior. 139 Professor Copelon explains:
The concepts of consent or acquiescence [in CAT] are broad
enough to embrace the failure of government to redress domestic
violence, even if the drafters did not have domestic violence in
mind. If the purpose of the “consent or acquiescence” language
was to cover situations where the state machinery does not work,
then gender-based violence is a case in point. Indeed, laws and
customs that exempt domestic aggressors from sanction, such as
marital rape exceptions or the defense of honor, reflect active
encouragement and consent of the state as well as formal gender
discrimination. The same is true of state law enforcement practices
which implicitly condone or minimize the seriousness of genderbased violence. Where domestic violence is a matter of common
knowledge and law enforcement and affirmative prevention
measures are inadequate, or where complaints are made and not
properly responded to, the state should be held to have
“acquiesced” in the continued infliction of violence.140

Lastly, Professor Copelon argues that CAT could even apply directly
against private individuals who have perpetrated acts of domestic
violence, thus bypassing the state as the primarily responsible party:
“[W]hile the CAT is limited to examining complaints against states
parties, the provisions for universal criminal jurisdiction and for
compensation should apply against any private person who commits
torture or domestic violence ‘at the instigation of’ or ‘with the
consent or acquiescence of’ an official.”141
When analyzing the applicability of particular CAT provisions to
individual domestic violence situations, as Professor Copelon and
others have done, one must note any reservations that a particular
State Party might have entered when it signed/ratified this treaty.142
138. See id. at arts. 12-14 (mandating a “prompt and impartial investigation” of
complaints and “fair and adequate compensation” for victims).
139. See id. at art. 1, para. 1.
140. Copelon, supra note 122, at 355-56.
141. Id. at 356.
142. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 44, at art. 19
(delineating requirements for making reservations); see also CAT, supra note 7, at
arts. 28, 30 (permitting reservations and withdrawal of reservations related to
recognizing the ability of the Committee against Torture to conduct inquiries and
dispute settlement procedures among signatories).
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Generally, the Committee Against Torture143 enforces CAT by
initiating investigations when it receives reliable information that
torture is being practiced within the territory of a State Party,144 by
reviewing communications submitted by a State Party alleging that
another State Party is not fulfilling its CAT obligations,145 and by
considering communications from individuals who claim that their
rights have been violated by a State Party to CAT.146 Thus, as
Professor Copelon and others have argued above, a victim of domestic
violence can file a communication with the Committee Against
Torture against her state of citizenship, alleging that the state has
failed to prosecute, investigate, implement preventive measures,
provide legal remedies, and/or grant compensation, or has consented
to or acquiesced in the violent behavior of her spouse by simply
turning a blind eye to her situation.147
More specifically, CAT can also be enforced within the context of
asylum, namely persons fleeing from persecution (including the
threat of torture) from their country of origin. If the country to
which they flee has signed and/or ratified CAT148 and denies them
asylum, individuals are entitled to file communications with the
143. See CAT, supra note 7, at art. 17 (creating a Committee Against Torture and
establishing selection procedures). See generally OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, FACT SHEET NO. 17 (providing
committee materials, including sessions, notes, complaints, and press releases), at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs17.htm (last visited May 20, 2004).
144. See CAT, supra note 7, at art. 20 (outlining investigatory procedures
comprised of confidential inquiries, reports, and visits).
145. See id. at art. 21 (delineating the requirements for State Party complaints
regarding another State Party’s failure to abide by CAT provisions).
146. See id. at art. 22 (explaining the individual complaint process); see also
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE:
OVERVIEW AND PROCEDURE, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/overcat.htm
(last visited May 20, 2004). See generally Documents by Treaty; CAT-Committee
Against
Torture;
Jurisprudence,
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
newhvdocsbytreaty?OpenView&Start=1&Count=750&Expand=2.5#2.5 (last visited
May 20, 2004).
147. See Copelon, supra note 122, at 356.
148. Implementation of CAT in each country depends upon the manner in which
each legal system incorporates international treaties and conventions within its legal
system. See, e.g., RESTATMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §111, cmt. h
(2002) (indicating that in the United States, it is up to the state “to decide how it will
carry out its international obligations. Accordingly, the intention of the United States
determines whether an agreement is to be self-executing in the United States or
should await implementation by legislation or appropriate executive or administrative
action”). For example, the United States has signed and ratified CAT by enacting
domestic legislation entitled the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of
1998, and a victim of torture seeking asylum in the United States may invoke this
particular act. See Stark 1, supra note 22, at 270; see also Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-761 (1998) (codified in
22 U.S.C. § 6501).
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Committee Against Torture.149 The committee, in turn, takes the
individual communications into consideration, deliberates upon their
admissibility and forms a view as to whether the provisions of CAT
asserted in the communications were violated.150 The most often
asserted CAT provision is Article 3, which forbids a state to return or
extradite persons in danger of being tortured back to their country of
origin.151 Following its deliberations, the committee then advises the
violating state in question to redress its practice (that is, not return or
extradite individuals in danger of being tortured and grant him/her
asylum in accordance with its obligations under CAT).152 Thus,
technically, if a domestic violence victim is suffering abuse that could
be equated to torture and is denied asylum, she may invoke Article 3
of CAT and file a communication against the state that is denying her
asylum before the Committee Against Torture.
E. Customary International Law
Some scholars maintain that domestic violence standards have
become part of customary international law, which is binding in
nature:
Customary international law may be shown through state practice
over time, in the form of state adherence to international treaties,
declarations, or General Assembly resolutions; through the
enactment of domestic legislation, through executive action, and
through a state’s own judicial decisions. The accretion of such
practice, accompanied by evidence that the state believed that such
practice was legally mandated, constitutes [customary international
law]. Where consensus among states is great, and no state objects,
less practice may be needed.153

States can be held responsible for tolerating and/or failing to
prevent domestic violence through the application of customary
international law. Professor Barbara Stark makes the case that by
signing the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
149. See CAT, supra note 7, at art. 22; see also OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, supra note 146. See generally
Documents by Treaty, CAT-Committee Against Torture; Jurisprudence, supra note
146.
150. See CAT, supra note 7, at art. 22.
151. See id. at art. 3.
152. See, e.g., Communication 149/1999: Sweden, CAT/C/25/D/149/1999,
paras. 8.2, 9 (2001) (advising Sweden that, under Article 3 of CAT, it was prohibited
from forcibly returning an Iranian citizen back to her country of origin because there
were “substantial grounds for believing that . . . she would be in danger of being
subjected to torture”), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/
3c43aa8300384387c1256ab1002fea71?Opendocument (last visited May 20, 2004).
153. See Stark 1, supra note 22, at 266.
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Women, 180 states have symbolically confirmed the importance of
combating domestic violence and can be held liable for failing to do
so through the declaration
in conjunction with the proliferation of domestic legislation,
executive action, and national judicial decisions which followed,
along with the repeated references to state responsibility for
domestic violence in reports of the Human Rights Commission, the
Special Rapporteur on Domestic Violence, and other international
instruments as well as regional human rights instruments . . . .154

Professor Stark further explains that once the responsibility of states
vis-à-vis domestic violence is established in customary international
law, the substance of domestic violence standards could be
“understood as a clarification and elaboration of existing [general
international] human rights norms.”155
III. REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
In order to better understand the development of domestic
violence standards at the international level, one must also consult
various regional human rights instruments.
The European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“ECHR”),156 the American Convention on Human Rights
(“ACHR”)157 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(“African Charter”)158 provide broad bases from which battered
women can assert their individual rights against their state of
citizenship. Once again, it should be emphasized that not all of the
provisions that are about to be analyzed are applicable in all domestic
violence situations, since a state can choose to sign/ratify the
aforementioned documents with reservations to certain provisions.159

154. See id. at 267.
155. See id.
156. See generally ECHR, supra note 8.
157. See generally ACHR, supra note 9.
158. See generally African Charter, supra note 11.
159. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 44, at art. 19
(delineating requirements for making reservations); see also ECHR, supra note 8, at
art. 57, para. 1.
Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its
instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular
provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its
territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general
character shall not be permitted under this article.
Id.
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Furthermore, these particular instruments have precise regional
limitations.160
A. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”)
Domestic violence norms can be read into the ECHR161 in the same
manner as they were read into the International Bill of Human Rights
and other international human rights instruments. That is, the ECHR
acknowledges the right to life in Article 2162 and the right to be free
from torture and from inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment in Article 3.163 Since Article 1 requires all States Parties
to secure the rights and freedoms delineated within the ECHR “to
everyone within their jurisdiction”164 and since Article 14 discusses
the ECHR’s ban on gender-based discrimination, women and men
are equally entitled to the aforementioned rights.165 Thus, battered
women can seek help through the domestic legal system and if (after
exhausting all domestic remedies) their situation does not improve,
they can hold their state of citizenship liable for failing to provide
them with an effective remedy.166 It is worth noting that the scope of
Article 13, which delineates the right to an effective remedy, is not
limited to violations of human rights by public officials; this article
applies “notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity.”167
Consequently, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”)
has found in favor of domestic violence victims, whose rights were
violated by private persons (i.e. their partners), and against their state
of citizenship because the state failed, inter alia, to provide them with
proper access to the courtroom and with effective legal remedies. In
Airey v. Ireland, a woman sought a court-ordered separation from her
160. See ECHR, supra note 8, at pmbl.; see ACHR, supra note 9, at pmbl.; see
African Charter, supra note 11, at pmbl.
161. See ECHR, supra note 8, at art. 59, para. 2 (“The present Convention shall
come into force after the deposit of ten instruments of ratification.”). The ECHR
entered into force on September 3, 1953.
162. See id. at art. 2.
163. See id. at art. 3.
164. See id. at art. 1 (emphasis added).
165. See id. at art. 14. It should be noted that Article 14 of the ECHR cannot be
invoked on its own. The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) indicates that
“Article 14 . . . has no independent existence; it constitutes one particular element
(non-discrimination) of each of the rights safeguarded by the Convention . . . .” See
Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 305, 318 (1979).
166. See ECHR, supra note 8, at art. 13.
167. See id.
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violent husband, but the Irish government did not provide her with
legal aid in order to pursue her claim.168 Starting in June 1972, Mrs.
Johanna Airey of Cork, Ireland sought a decree of judicial separation
alleging that her husband physically and mentally abused her and her
children.169
Her husband had been previously convicted for
assaulting her and fined.170 Given her low income, Mrs. Airey could
not retain a solicitor to represent her in the separation proceedings
and, at that time, the state of Ireland did not offer legal aid for civil
matters.171 As a result, Mrs. Airey filed a petition with the then
existing European Commission of Human Rights (“European
Her
Commission”),172 which forwarded it to the ECtHR.173
complaint stated the following:
[T]he State [of Ireland] had failed to protect her against physical
and mental cruelty from her allegedly violent and alcoholic
husband:
-by not detaining him for treatment as an alcoholic;
-by not ensuring that he paid maintenance to her regularly;
-in that, because of the prohibitive cost of proceedings, she could
not obtain a judicial separation.174

In order to sustain her last allegation, Mrs. Airey invoked the
following ECHR provisions:
-Article 6 [para. 1] of the Convention, by reason of the fact that her
right of access to a court was effectively denied;
- Article 8 . . . by reason of the failure of the State to ensure that
there is an accessible legal procedure to determine rights and
obligations which have been created by legislation regulating family
matters;
-Article 13 . . . in that she was deprived of an effective remedy
before a national authority for the violations complained of;
168. See Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 310 (explaining that in Ireland, legal aid was not
provided for a person seeking a judicial separation of a marriage).
169. See id. at 311 (claiming that the State failed to protect Mrs. Airey and her
children from the alcoholic and violent Mr. Airey).
170. See id. (explaining how the District Court of Cork City convicted and fined
Mr. Airey for assault in January 1972).
171. See id. at 307-10.
172. See THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, HISTORICAL BACKGROUND,
ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE (2003) [hereinafter ECTHR BACKGROUND] (explaining
how the European Commission of Human Rights (“European Commission”) and the
original European Court of Human Rights were replaced by a full-time court on Nov.
1, 1998), at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Edocs/ HistoricalBackground.htm (last
visited May 18, 2004).
173. See Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R at 310-11.
174. Id.
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-Article 14 in conjunction with Article 6. [para. 1] in that judicial
separation is more easily available to those who can afford to pay
than to those without financial resources.175

The ECtHR found that because Mrs. Airey’s financial situation
prevented her from hiring an attorney and she would not be able to
effectively represent herself in her judicial separation proceedings
and since legal aid was not made available in such civil suits, Ireland
breached Article 6, paragraph 1 of the ECHR that guarantees the
right to access the judicial system.176 Setting aside Mrs. Airey’s
allegations under Article 14177 and Article 13178 for procedural
reasons, the ECtHR also found that the state of Ireland was in
violation of Article 8 of the ECHR, which the Court read as
establishing the right to respect for private and family life.179 The
ECtHR reasoned that:
[A]lthough the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting
the individual against arbitrary interference by the public
authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from
such interference: in addition to this primarily negative
undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an
effective respect for private and family life.180

According to the Court, Ireland violated this particular right by not
facilitating the judicial separation of the Aireys. The ECtHR
explained in the following manner:
In Ireland, many aspects of private or family life are regulated by
law. As regards marriage, husband and wife are in principle under
a duty to cohabit but are entitled, in certain cases, to petition for a
decree of judicial separation; this amounts to recognition of the fact
that the protection of their private or family life may sometimes
necessitate their being relieved from the duty to live together.
Effective respect for private or family life obliges Ireland to make

175. Id.
176. See ECHR, supra note 8, at art. 6, para. 1; see also Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 318
(“Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the Court finds that Mrs. Airey
did not enjoy an effective right of access to the High Court for the purpose of
petitioning for a decree of judicial separation.”).
177. See Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 318 (explaining that Article 14 of the ECHR
(prohibiting discrimination) has “no independent existence”). Article 14 is solely
used to qualify other rights delineated in the ECHR, therefore, it was not analyzed
separately for the purposes of the Airey case. Id.
178. Id. at 319 (indicating that Article 13, which guarantees the right to an
effective remedy, overlaps with Article 6, paragraph 1, thus it would not be analyzed).
179. See ECHR, supra note 8, at art. 8; see also Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 319.
180. Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 319.
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this means of protection effectively accessible, when appropriate, to
anyone who may wish to have recourse thereto.181

In Mrs. Airey’s case, the ECtHR concluded that the state of Ireland
did not effectively provide for such protection since the petitioner was
not able to reach the proper judicial forum and “she was unable to
seek recognition in law of her de facto separation from her
husband.”182
Consequently, Ireland violated Article 8 of the
ECHR.183 Such is the manner in which the ECtHR interpreted and
applied various ECHR provisions in favor of a victim of domestic
violence.
The ECtHR continued its trend of protecting battered women with
the case of S.W. v. United Kingdom.184 In that case, the petitioner
was charged with rape under England’s Sexual Offences Act, as well as
threatening to kill and assault occasioning actual bodily harm, under
England’s Offences Against the Person Act.185 The victim of these
alleged crimes was his wife.186 A jury found the petitioner guilty of all
three offenses187 and he appealed in domestic court, arguing that a
husband could not be found guilty of raping his wife because,
according to traditional British law, a woman gives her implied
consent to sexual intercourse at the time of marriage.188 The
petitioner recognized that British law had evolved, carving out certain
exceptions to this absolute notion of implied consent,189 however, he
argued that these changes in the law were not confirmed until later
and, thus, were incorrectly, retroactively applied to his case.190 After
all of his domestic appeals were unsuccessful, the petitioner filed an
application with the European Commission (later referred to the

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 321 (holding four votes to three that Article 8 had been breached).
184. See S.W. v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 363 (1995).
185. See id. at 365 (reciting the charges against a male British citizen accused of
raping his wife).
186. See id. (retelling the story of the turbulent marriage of the accused and his
wife).
187. See id. at 369 (stating the accused was found guilty and sentenced to over five
years in prison).
188. See id. at 365-68 (relying on a British common law principle established in
1736).
189. See id. at 366 (describing the 1976 British case of R v. Steele where the
implied consent to sexual intercourse of a wife could be revoked 1) by a court order
or equivalent 2) by agreement or 3) by “withdrawal of either party from cohabitation,
accompanied by a clear indication that consent to sexual intercourse has been
terminated”). See generally R. v. Steele, 65 Crim. App. R. 22 (1976).
190. See S.W., 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 368-70.
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ECtHR) under Article 7 of the ECHR,191 which dictates that “[n]o
one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act
or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under
national or international law at the time when it was committed.”192
The petitioner maintained that “he was convicted in respect of
conduct, namely the rape upon his wife, which at the relevant time
did not . . . constitute a criminal offence.”193
The ECtHR responded by primarily acknowledging the importance
of Article 7 of the ECHR as safeguarding against arbitrary
prosecution, conviction and punishment by prohibiting retroactive
application of the law and by stressing that offences must be clearly
defined in the law.194 The Court emphasized, however, that Article 7,
cannot be read as outlawing clarification of rules of criminal liability
through judicial interpretation from case to case, provided that the
result is consistent with the essence of the offence and could
reasonably be foreseen.195 Thus, in the case at hand, the gradual
modification of the common law principle that a husband cannot be
found guilty of raping his wife,196 which included the development of
exceptions to this absolute rule,197 was not barred by Article 7 of the
ECHR because such changes were consistent with the essence of the
general offense of rape in British law.198 Furthermore, the petitioner
himself did not dispute the fact that, had the victim not been his wife,
the conduct for which he was convicted could have constituted
rape.199 Accordingly, the ECtHR coupled the gradual transformation
of British law regarding marital rape with the petitioner’s acclamation
and agreed with the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom that “a
rapist remains a rapist subject to the criminal law, irrespective of his
relationship with his victim.”200 The ECtHR’s overall conclusion was
that, at the time of the alleged conduct on the part of the petitioner, a
husband could be found guilty of raping his wife under British

191. See id. at 373.
192. See ECHR, supra note 8, at art. 7, para. 1.
193. See S.W., 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 373.
194. See id. at 374.
195. See id. at 375.
196. See id.
197. See id. at para. 43.
198. See id. (“[T]here was an evident evolution, which was consistent with the very
essence of the offence, of the criminal law through judicial interpretation towards
treating such conduct generally as within the scope of the offence of rape.”).
199. See id.
200. Id.
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criminal law.201
Thus, one could argue that by barring the
petitioner’s Article 7 claim in such a manner, the ECtHR reaffirmed a
vital protection and legal remedy for domestic violence victims: the
criminal prosecution of their husbands for physical and sexual
violence that rises to the level of marital rape.202
Another protection made available to domestic violence victims by
the ECtHR, is the Court’s affirmation of the prohibition of torture
and ill-treatment delineated in Article 3 of the ECHR.203 In A. v.
United Kingdom, the ECtHR found that the United Kingdom
violated Article 3 by not providing adequate protection to a nine-year
old boy who was repeatedly beaten with a cane by his stepfather.204 In
February 1993, school authorities notified the Social Services
Department that the petitioner, nine years old at the time, was often
beaten by his stepfather.205 A medical consultation revealed that “the
bruising [on A.’s body] was consistent with the use of a garden cane
applied with considerable force on more than one occasion.”206
British authorities arrested A.’s stepfather and charged him with
assault occasioning actual bodily harm.207 At trial, the stepfather
raised the defense that “parents and other persons in loco parentis
are protected by the law if they administer punishment which is
moderate and reasonable in the circumstances.”208 The jury entered
a verdict of “not guilty” against the stepfather.209 Subsequently, A.
filed an application with the European Commission, which was later
forwarded to the ECtHR, alleging that the United Kingdom
had failed to protect him from ill-treatment by his step-father, in
violation of Articles 3 and/or 8 of the Convention; that he had
been denied a remedy for these complaints in violation of Article
13; and that the domestic law on assault discriminated against

201. See id. at 377 (stating that “by September 1990 there was significant doubt as
to the validity of the alleged marital immunity for rape”).
202. See supra Part I (incorporating physical and sexual violence into the overall
definition of domestic violence).
203. See ECHR, supra note 8, at art. 3 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
204. See A. v. the United Kingdom, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 611 (1999).
205. See id. at 613-14 (stating that petitioner’s brother notified the head teacher
about the physical abuse).
206. See id. at 614.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id. (finding that the prosecution had not proven the stepfather was guilty
of assault occasioning actual bodily harm).
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children, in violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 3
and 8.210

Setting aside the allegations made under Articles 8, 13, and 14 of
the ECHR for procedural reasons,211 the ECtHR analyzed two issues:
whether the ill-treatment of A. attained the minimum level of severity
such that it qualified as conduct prohibited by Article 3212 and
whether the United Kingdom was to be held responsible under
Article 3.213 As to the first issue, the ECtHR used the test for
minimum severity, which is dependent upon “all [the] circumstances
of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its
duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the
sex, age and state of health of the victim,”214 and found that the
repeated beatings applied with considerable force upon A.’s person
amounted to ill-treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR.215 As to the
second issue, the ECtHR noted that Article 1 together with Article 3
of the ECHR impose a duty upon states to implement measures
ensuring that their citizens are not subjected to ill-treatment or
torture, including situations when such treatment is administered by
private individuals.216
Furthermore, the ECtHR stressed that
“[c]hildren and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are
entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence of the
criminal law, against such serious breaches of personal integrity.”217
In sum, the Court found that the United Kingdom was responsible
under Article 3 since it did not adequately protect the applicant
(through its laws) against ill-treatment by his stepfather.218
It seems that victims of domestic violence would benefit
significantly from the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 3 in this case.
Battered women, who are subjected to abuse rising to the level of
torture or ill-treatment under Article 3, could certainly qualify as
vulnerable individuals who are especially deserving of state

210. See id. at 615.
211. See id. at 626-27 (holding that if a finding was made under Article 3, the
ECtHR would not deliberate upon Article 8, Article 14 or Article 13).
212. See id. at 616-17 (debating whether a stepfather hitting his stepson
constituted “torture or inhumane, degrading treatment”).
213. See id.
214. See id. at 618.
215. See id. at 619-20 (citing the significant physical injury, pain and humiliation
as reasons to qualify the treatment under Article 3).
216. See id. at 621.
217. Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
218. See id. at 623.
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protection.219 If their state of citizenship fails to protect them from a
repeated pattern of severe abuse, either because of inadequate laws or
laws that are inappropriately applied, then that state has violated
Article 3 of the ECHR.220
The ECHR is currently enforced by a newly mandated court,
ECtHR, whose jurisdiction was reaffirmed in 1998 through Protocol
No. 11 to the Convention.221 Previously, the two bodies that
monitored ECHR implementation were a commission and a court.222
The commission issued recommendations while the court (past and
present) issues binding decisions. Neither the past nor the present
court, however, have police powers to compel States Parties to the
ECHR to comply with their judgments.223 Thus a domestic violence
victim can file her grievances with the ECtHR after she has exhausted
all of her domestic remedies and her state of citizenship has failed to
rectify her situation. An ECtHR decision in favor of such a victim,
though, could face enforceability challenges at the state level.
B. American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”) and InterAmerican Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women (“Inter-American Convention
on Violence Against Women”)
The ACHR224 and the Inter-American Convention on Violence
Against Women225 may also be used to protect the rights of battered
women. The ACHR recognizes the right to life in Article 4226 and the
right to humane treatment in Article 5.227 Women, together with
men, are equally entitled to these rights. The ACHR imposes upon its
State Parties the obligation to respect and ensure the rights and
freedoms included in the convention, for “all persons subject to their
jurisdiction . . . without any discrimination for reasons of race, color,

219. See id. at 622 (observing that Article 3 applies to the “protection of vulnerable
individuals”).
220. See id. at 623-24.
221. See ECTHR BACKGROUND, supra note 172, at para. 6 (describing the creation
of the new European Court of Human Rights).
222. See id.
223. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 552.
224. The ACHR entered into force on July 18, 1978. See ACHR, supra note 9, at
art. 74, para. 2 (“As soon as eleven states have deposited their instruments of
ratification or adherence, the Convention shall enter into force.”).
225. See generally Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra
note 10.
226. See ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 4.
227. See id. at art. 5.
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sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”228
Furthermore, the ACHR guarantees that “[a]ll persons are equal
before the law.
Consequently, they are entitled, without
discrimination, to equal protection of the law.”229 Given this clear
ban on gender discrimination, the ACHR could prove to be helpful
for battered women. Thus, victims who find themselves subjected to
domestic violence may make use of the legal remedies available to
them through their domestic court system. If these domestic
remedies fail,230 broadly delineated human rights within the ACHR
provide protection and hold their state of citizenship responsible at
the regional level.231
The Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, also
known as the Convention of Belém do Pará, entered into force on
March 5, 1995 and is geared entirely towards women’s rights,
particularly women who have been subjected to some form of
violence.232 Article 1 defines violence against women as “any act of
conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or
private sphere.”233 Thus, Article 1 covers victims who suffer physical
or mental abuse within the home (i.e. domestic violence). Article 3
228. Id. at art. 1, para. 1 (emphasis added).
229. Id. at art. 24.
230. See ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 46(1)(a) (requiring that before an individual
petition is reviewed “remedies under domestic law [must] have been pursued and
exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law”);
see also Fairén Garbi & Solís Corrales, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 6, at 17, para. 79
(1989) (addressing the primary issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies), available
at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_13d.htm (last visited May 18, 2004);
see also Velásquez Rodríguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 4, at 12, para. 61 (1988)
(explaining that the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement “allows the State
to resolve the problem under its internal law before being confronted with an
international proceeding” and that the State has a legal duty to provide such
remedies), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/4-ing.html (last
visited May 20, 2004); see also Godínez Cruz, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 5, at 12,
para. 70 (1989) (addressing the same requirement of exhaustion of domestic
remedies), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_14d.htm (last
visited May 18, 2004).
231. See Garbi & Corrales, supra note 230, at para. 136 (“The objective of
international human rights law is not to punish those individuals who are guilty of
violations, but rather to protect the victims and to provide for the reparation of
damages resulting from acts of the States responsible.”); see also Velásquez
Rodríguez, supra note 230, at 30-31 (explaining the various components of state
responsibility under the ACHR); see also Godínez Cruz, supra note 230, at 23, paras.
140-42 (addressing the notion of state responsibility).
232. See Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra note 10,
at art. 21 (“This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date
of deposit of the second State that ratifies or accedes to the Convention. . . .”).
233. Id. at art. 1 (emphasis added).
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reaffirms that “[e]very woman has the right to be free from violence
in both the public and private spheres.”234 Article 6 affirms every
woman’s right to be free from violence which includes: “a) [t]he right
of women to be free from all forms of discrimination; and b) [t]he
right of women to be valued and educated free of stereotyped
patterns of behavior and social practices based on concepts of
inferiority or subordination.”235 In Article 7, States Parties to the
convention pledge to undertake “policies to prevent, punish and
eradicate” violence against women including passing domestic
legislation in this vein, adopting legal measures requiring perpetrators
“to refrain from harassing, intimidating and employing any method
that harms or endangers” the lives, integrity or property of women,
taking appropriate measures to stop customary practices that promote
violence against women, and ensuring the existence of fair and
effective legal procedures and remedies for victims of such
violence.236 Thus, the Inter-American Convention on Violence
Against Women seems to be the most pertinent regional instrument
that domestic violence victims can invoke against their state of
citizenship.
In fact, a domestic violence case was brought before the InterAmerican human rights system in April 2001 invoking provisions of
the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women in
addition to applicable ACHR provisions. Maria da Penha Maia
Fernandes filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (“IACHR”)237 alleging that Brazil had failed to
effectively prevent and punish brutal acts of domestic violence
perpetrated against her by her husband over a period of more than
fifteen years.238 On May 29, 1983, Mrs. Fernandes was shot by her
husband while she was asleep. This event was the culmination of a
pattern of abuse against her and her children throughout the
marriage.239 As a result of the shooting, Mrs. Fernandes sustained
numerous injuries and suffered irreversible paraplegia as well as other

234. Id. at art. 3.
235. Id. at art. 6.
236. See id. at art. 7.
237. See generally Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”),
available at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/commissn.htm (last visited May
20, 2004).
238. See generally Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. C.
H.R., doc. 54/01 (2001) (retelling the story of repeated physical abuse by her
husband and her claim for relief), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/
2000eng/chapteriii/merits/brazil12.051.htm (last visited May 18, 2004).
239. See id. at para. 2.
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physical and psychological trauma.240 The violence continued upon
her return from the hospital as her husband attempted to kill her
again, this time by electrocution.241 She argued that the attacks were
premeditated since her husband had previously asked her to sign a
life insurance policy and attempted to force her to sign a sales
contract on her car, which did not indicate the name of the
purchaser.242 Subsequently, Mrs. Fernandes also learned that her
husband had a criminal record, practiced bigamy, and fathered a
child in Colombia.243 Her husband was eventually prosecuted for the
1983 shooting in domestic court.244 Despite the clearly stated charges
and the preponderance of evidence, the proceedings were prolonged
for eight years with a jury finally convicting and sentencing him to
fifteen years in prison for assault and attempted murder on May 4,
1991.245 An appeals court overturned the verdict accepting the
defense’s argument that the questions to the jury were flawed.246 On
March 15, 1996, a second trial by jury took place in domestic court
sentencing Mrs. Fernandes’ husband to ten years and six months in
prison.247 A second appeal followed and the decision was still
pending when Mrs. Fernandes filed her petition with the IACHR on
August 20, 1998.248 The state of Brazil did not respond to the
IACHR’s requests in connection with her claim.249
Given these facts, Mrs. Fernandes alleged in her petition that the
local judicial system and the state of Brazil were “ineffective, as seen in
their failure to conduct proceedings in a prompt and efficient
manner, thereby creating a great risk of impunity, since punishment
in this case will be barred by the statute of limitations twenty years
after the occurrence of these events. . . .”250 The state of Brazil should
have ensured that Mrs. Fernandes received compensation for her
suffering “by guaranteeing her a fair trial within a reasonable time
240. See id. at para. 8.
241. See id. at para. 9 (retelling the events of the second murder attempt).
242. See id. at para. 10.
243. See id.
244. See id. at paras. 12-13.
245. See id. at para. 13.
246. See id. at para. 15.
247. See id. at paras. 16-17.
248. See id. at para. 4.
249. See id. at para. 25 (“The Brazilian State has not provided the Commission
with a response regarding the admissibility or the merits of the petition, despite the
requests of the Commission to the State on October 19, 1998, August 4, 1999, and
August 7, 2000.”).
250. See id. at para. 19.
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period.”251
Furthermore, the delayed response to the abuse
perpetrated against Mrs. Fernandes was not an isolated incident: “it is
an example of a pattern of impunity in cases of domestic violence
against women in Brazil, since the majority of complaints filed do not
lead to criminal prosecution and in the few cases where they do, the
perpetrators are convicted in only a small number of cases.”252 Citing
statistics, Mrs. Fernandes argued that Brazil had failed to prevent
domestic violence, in general, and had failed to investigate, prosecute
and punish domestic abusers despite its international obligations.253
Lastly, Mrs. Fernandes indicated that the delay on the part of
Brazilian judicial authorities to render a decision against her husband
not only raised statute of limitations issues but would also create
difficulties if she attempted to seek civil reparations.254 Mrs.
Fernandes asserted the above claims as violations of the following
rights inscribed in the ACHR: Article 1, paragraph 1 (obligation to
respect),255 Article 8 (right to fair trial),256 Article 24 (right to equal
protection),257 and Article 25 (right to judicial protection).258 All
ACHR rights were related to Articles II259 and XVIII260 of the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (“American
Declaration”). Mrs. Fernandes also invoked Articles 3,261 4(a)-(g),262

251. Id.
252. See id. at para. 20.
253. See id. at para. 21.
254. See id. at para. 23.
255. See ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 1, para. 1 (stating that the Convention must
ensure that all persons are free to exercise the rights and freedoms recognized by the
Convention without discrimination).
256. See id. at art. 8.
257. See id. at art. 24.
258. See id. at art. 25.
259. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX
(1948), art. II [hereinafter American Declaration] (“All persons are equal before the
law and have the rights and duties established in this Declaration, without distinction
as to race, sex, language, creed or any other factor.”), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas2dec.htm (last visited May 20, 2004).
260. See id. at art. XVIII (“Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect
for his legal rights. There should likewise be available to him a simple, brief
procedure whereby courts will protect him from acts of authority that, to his
prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional rights.”).
261. See Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra note 10,
at art. 3 (“Every woman has the right to be free from violence in both the public and
private spheres.”).
262. See id. at art. 4(a)-(g) (ensuring certain rights for women such as the right to
life, right to physical, mental and moral integrity, right to personal liberty and
security, right to be free from torture, right to privacy within personal and family life,
right to equal protection and right to legal recourse).
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5263 and 7264 of the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against
Women.
The IACHR responded by analyzing Mrs. Fernandes’ case on the
merits and by drawing certain preliminary conclusions before
referring the case to the IACtHR.265 Concerning Brazil’s obligation
to respect and ensure266 the right to justice inscribed in Article XVIII
of the American Declaration,267 ACHR Article 8, guaranteeing the
right to fair trial,268 and ACHR Article 25, ensuring judicial
protection,269 the IACHR found a violation.270 The IACHR indicated
that “the judicial delay and long wait for decisions on appeals reveal
conduct on the part of the judicial authorities that violates the right to
the prompt and effective remedies provided for in the Declaration
and the Convention.”271 Furthermore the commission found that:
the domestic judicial decisions in this case reveal inefficiency,
negligence, and failure to act on the part of the Brazilian judicial
authorities and unjustified delay in the prosecution of the accused.
These decisions are standing in the way of punishment of the
accused and are raising the specter of impunity and failure to
compensate the victim as a result of barring of the offense by the
statute of limitations. They demonstrate that the State has not been
capable of organizing its entities in a manner that guarantees those
rights.272

As to Article 24 of the ACHR, ensuring equal protection before the
law,273 together with Articles II274 and XVIII275 of the American
Declaration, the IACHR also found a violation.276 The commission
263. See id. at art. 5 (describing the full entitlement of women to freely and fully
exercise their rights, which are inscribed in regional and international instruments,
and acknowledging that violence against women is an impediment in this regard).
264. See id. at art. 7 (outlining the duties of States to “prevent, punish and
eradicate” violence against women).
265. See Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes, supra note 238, at para. 3 (concluding
that the state violated Mrs. Fernandes’ rights to a fair trial and judicial protection, and
that the violation forms a pattern in Brazil of condoning domestic violence against
women).
266. See ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 1, para. 1.
267. See American Declaration, supra note 259, at art. XVIII.
268. See ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 8.
269. See id. at art. 25.
270. See Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes, supra note 238, at para. 141.
271. See id.
272. See id. at para. 44.
273. See ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 24.
274. See American Declaration, supra note 259, at art. II.
275. See id. at art. XVIII.
276. See Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes, supra note 238, at para. 3.
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made reference to various reports, including a domestic violence
study conducted in Brazil as well as one of its special reports on the
human rights situation in Brazil, and found that Brazilian authorities
are not responding properly to the needs of battered women.277
While improvements have been made, such as the establishment of
special police stations to address reports of violence against women,
the creation of shelters, and a Supreme Court decision to strike down
the notion of the “honor defense” as a justification for wife-killing in
Brazil, the IACHR declared that “these initiatives have not had any
effect whatsoever.”278 Lastly, the IACHR found a violation of Article 7
of the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women,
which outlines various duties that States owe their citizens in
preventing, punishing and eradicating violence against women
(domestic violence included)279 as well as a violation of Articles 3280
and 4(a)-(g)281 of the same instrument.282 The IACHR reasoned that
[t]he failure to prosecute and convict the perpetrator under these
circumstances is an indication that the State condones the violence
suffered by Maria da Penha, and this failure by the Brazilian courts
to take action is exacerbating the direct consequences of the
aggression by her ex-husband. Furthermore . . . that tolerance by
the State organs is not limited to this case; rather, it is a pattern . . . .
Given the fact that the violence suffered by Maria da Penha is part
of a general pattern of negligence and lack of effective action by the
State in prosecuting and convicting aggressors, it is the view of the
Commission that this case involves not only failure to fulfill the
obligation with respect to prosecut[ion] and convict[ion], but also
the obligation to prevent these degrading practices. That general
and discriminatory judicial ineffectiveness also creates a climate that
is conducive to domestic violence, since society sees no evidence of
willingness by the State, as the representative of the society, to take
effective action to sanction such acts.283

277. See id. at para. 47 (finding that clear discrimination exists against battered
women arising from an inadequate justice system and uneven application of national
and international laws in Brazil).
278. Id. at para. 50.
279. See Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra note 10,
at art. 7 (condemning all forms of violence against women).
280. See id. at art. 3 (delineating that all women have the right to be free from
violence).
281. See id. at art. 4(a)-(g) (outlining the right to life, right to physical, mental and
moral integrity, right to personal liberty and security, right to be free from torture,
right to privacy within personal and family life, right to equal protection and right to
legal recourse).
282. See Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes, supra note 238, at para. 3.
283. See id. at paras. 55-56.
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Consequently, the IACHR indicated that Brazil had violated the
aforementioned provisions of the Inter-American Convention on
Violence Against Women.284
Mrs. Fernandes’ petition marked a milestone for women’s rights
because it is one of the first cases to apply the Inter-American
Convention on Violence Against Women and because it has brought
attention to the issue of domestic violence in the Inter-American
human rights system. In 2002, the IACHR continued this trend by
issuing a report that addressed the problem of violence against
women (domestic violence included) occurring in Ciudad Juárez,
Mexico.285
Responding to the requests of numerous
nongovernmental organizations, the IACHR examined and reported
on a disturbing pattern of killings in Ciudad Juárez: since 1993, over
200 women had been killed and left in impunity as the state failed to
investigate, prosecute, punish and prevent such crimes.286 The
IACHR found that “many of these killings are manifestations of
violence based on gender, particularly sexual violence and domestic
or intra-familial violence.”287 Furthermore, the Commission pointed
out that
While public and official attention [in Mexico] have focused on the
brutality of and fear associated with the so-called “serial” killings,
insufficient attention has been devoted to the need to address the
discrimination that underlines crimes of sexual and domestic
violence, and that underlies the lack of effective clarification and
prosecution.288

Reiterating Mexico’s obligations under various international and
regional human rights instruments, including the ACHR and the
Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women,289 the
IACHR concluded its report with several recommendations geared to
improve the application of due diligence “to investigate, prosecute
and punish violence against women . . . and overcome impunity” as
well as “to prevent violence against women . . . and increase their
security” in Ciudad Juárez.290 Since the issuance of this report, the
284. See id. at para. 58.
285. See generally INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE SITUATION
OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CIUDAD JUAREZ, MEXICO: THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM
VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION (2002) [hereinafter CIUDAD JUAREZ REPORT], available
at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/chap.vi.juarez.htm (last visited May 20,
2004).
286. See id. at paras. 3, 7, 41-68.
287. See id. at paras. 11, 57-64.
288. See id. at paras. 11, 69-87.
289. See id. at paras. 99-108.
290. See id. at paras. 161-end (concluding with general recommendations to
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IACHR has received, and is currently processing, several individual
petitions concerning the death of women and girls in Ciudad
Juárez.291
Both the ACHR and the Inter-American Convention on Violence
Against Women are interpreted and enforced by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”)292 and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”)293 with respect to members of
the Organization of American States294 who are States Parties to the
two instruments.
The IACHR can receive and analyze
communications alleging violations of the ACHR from States Parties
to the convention against other States Parties.295 More specifically,
the IACHR can receive petitions from individuals (and NGO’s)
containing allegations that a particular State Party violated the
ACHR296 and/or the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against
Women.297 The IACHR then issues nonbinding recommendations
and/or refers the petitions to the IACtHR.298
With respect solely to the Inter-American Convention on Violence
improve the domestic violence situation in Cuidad Juárez).
291. See CIUDAD JUAREZ REPORT, supra note 285, at para. 26 (processing four
petitions, 104/02, 281/02, 282/02, and 283/02, at this time and evaluating other
petitions as they are filed).
292. See generally Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”), at
http://www.oas.org/ (last visited May 20, 2004).
293. See generally Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”), at
http://www.oas.org/ (last visited May 20, 2004).
294. See ACHR, supra note 9, at pmbl.
295. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 524; see also ACHR, supra note 9, at arts. 45-46
(describing communications that can be initiated by States Parties to the ACHR
against other States Parties and delineating the filing requirements for state
petitions).
296. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 524; see also ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 44
(allowing individuals or groups that are legally recognized members of the
organization of American States to file petitions with the IACHR against States
Parties). Also delineating the filing requirements for individual petitions. Id. at art.
46.
297. See Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra note 10,
at art. 12 (indicating that individuals and groups can lodge petitions with the IACHR
alleging violations of the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women).
The IACHR has, in fact, been poised to interpret the Inter-American Convention on
Violence Against Women in at least two cases: the case of Maria da Penha Maia
Fernandes mentioned above and the case of Indravani Pamela Ramjattan. See
generally Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes, supra note 238; see also Indravani Pamela
Ramjattan, Case 11.837, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., no. 92/98, at 2 (1998), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/98eng/admissibility/t&t%2011837.htm (last visited
May 20, 2004). The Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women does
not, however, make express reference to the competence of the IACtHR. See E-mail
from Elizabeth Abi-Mershed, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“IACHR”), to Andreea Vesa, Fellow, ABA/CEELI (Apr. 09, 2003, 12:37 EST) (on file
with author).
298. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 524-25.
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Against Women, the Inter-American Commission on Women299 can
also play an advisory role as petitions are forwarded.300 The IACtHR
can issue binding decisions with respect to individual petitions
referred by the IACHR (or by States Parties directly).301 The IACtHR
may also issue advisory opinions regarding the interpretation of the
ACHR and the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against
Women at the request of the IACHR or States Parties.302 The
IACtHR’s decisions are final and not subject to appeal.303 Thus,
domestic violence victims can utilize both regional mechanisms (the
commission and the court) in order to assert their rights and hold
signatories of the ACHR and the Inter-American Convention on
Violence Against Women legally responsible for failing to protect
them from their abusive partners. Just like in the European system of
human rights, though, enforceability of IACtHR decisions could
become a problem at the state level.
C. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African
Charter”) and Its Draft Protocol
Another regional instrument that may be used by victims of
domestic violence is the African Charter, which entered into force on
October 21, 1986.304 The Charter imposes a general duty upon its
States Parties to “recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined
in [the] Charter and . . . to adopt legislative or other measures to give
effect to them.”305 The right to life and integrity of the person are
299. See Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra note 10,
at art. 10.
300. One expert explains that the IACHR primarily interprets the Inter-American
Convention on Violence Against Women and its juridical application. However, the
Inter-American Commission on Women also has a role in receiving reports as to the
implementation of the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women and,
in turn, reports on that information.The main difference between the IACHR and
the Inter-American Commission of Women is that the former is composed of
independent autonomous experts, while the latter is composed of state appointed
delegates representing each of the States Parties to the Inter-American Convention
on Violence Against Women. See E-mail from Elizabeth Abi-Mershed, supra note
297.
301. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 524-25; see also ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 61,
para. 1 (“Only the States Parties and the Commission shall have the right to submit a
case to the Court.”).
302. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 524; see also ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 64; see
also Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra note 10, at art.
11.
303. See ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 67.
304. See African Charter, supra note 11; see also List of Countries Who Have
Signed, Ratified/Adhered to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ratz1afchr.htm (last visited May 20, 2004).
305. African Charter, supra note 11, at art. 1.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol12/iss2/3

48

Vesa: International and Regional Standards for Protecting Victims of Do
VESA.DOC

2004]

9/10/2004 4:59 PM

PROTECTING VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

357

inscribed in Article 4 of the Charter.306 Article 5 guarantees the right
to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment.307 Article 16, paragraph 1 of the African Charter
emphasizes that “[e]very individual shall have the right to enjoy the
best attainable state of physical and mental health.”308 Gender
equality is a constant theme throughout the African Charter. Article 2
affirms that “[e]very individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of
the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present
Charter,”309 while Article 3 declares that “[e]very individual shall be
equal before the law”310 and “[e]very individual shall be entitled to
equal protection of the law.”311 Article 18, paragraph 3 discusses
women’s rights in particular and indicates that “[t]he State shall
ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and
also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as
stipulated in international declarations and conventions.”312 One
commentator makes the point that while the Charter touches upon
gender equality, the aforementioned articles still fail to fully address
women’s issues because they do not dedicate separate provisions
solely to women.313 However, by placing certain limitations on
306. See id. at art. 4.
307. See id. at art. 5 (prohibiting all forms of exploitation and degradation of man,
“particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment
and treatment”).
308. Id. at art. 16, para. 1 (emphasis added).
309. Id. at art. 2 (emphasis added).
310. Id. at art. 3, para. 1 (emphasis added).
311. See African Charter, supra note 11, at art. 3, para. 2 (emphasis added).
312. Id. at art. 18, para. 3.
313. Julia Harrington makes the following observations:
Article 2 might be criticized, however, on grounds that it fails to give
sufficient weight to women’s rights because sexual discrimination is placed in
the middle of a long list of other grounds on which distinctions are not
permitted. Given the extremely serious discrimination that women suffer in
Africa, it might be thought that a separate article specifically on women
would have been more appropriate to give the rights of women the weight
that they need and deserve. Articles 3-14 of the Charter present civil and
political rights; none mentions women specifically . . . .
On the other hand, the plain language of Article 18.3 requires states to
eliminate every form of discrimination against women, and the article’s
reference to ‘international declarations and conventions’ has wide
significance in that it incorporates international standards, including those in
nonbinding declarations. The African Charter’s provisions, including those
on economic rights, have more detailed counterparts in the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. By reference
to Article 18.3, the provisions of the Women’s Convention are essentially
incorporated into the African Charter. This is of particular significance
because relatively few African states have ratified the Women’s Convention,
and many have done so with substantial reservations.
Julia Harrington, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in 2
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others, the Charter inadvertently provides additional protections from
which women can benefit.314 For example, Article 28 imposes a duty
on every individual “to respect and consider his fellow beings without
discrimination.”315 One could argue that by imposing such a duty
upon men, women are automatically protected.316 Thus, victims of
domestic violence are entitled to invoke the above provisions of the
African Charter in order to require their state of citizenship to uphold
their right to life, right against torture and ill-treatment, right to good
mental and physical health as well as their right to be protected from
gender-based discrimination and to provide them with the requisite
safeguards and legal remedies against their abusers.
A more relevant document for domestic violence victims within the
African system is the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (“Protocol to
African Charter”).317 This document was initiated by a working group
in January 1998.318 A Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in
Africa was also appointed in order to oversee the continued
development of the protocol.319 Among other things, the instrument
requires States Parties to the African Charter to undertake
appropriate measures in order to eliminate discrimination against
women320 as well as violence against women (including domestic
violence).321 However, as of March 2004, the protocol remains in

WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 455-70, 457, 459 (Kelly D. Askin &
Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2000).
314. See id. at 460.
315. African Charter, supra note 11, at art. 28.
316. See Harrington, supra note 313, at 460 (stating, “Given that men discriminate
against women at least as much as women discriminate against men, this article can
only be an advantage to women.”).
317. See generally Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
on the Rights of Women in Africa, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6 (1999) [hereinafter
Draft Protocol to African Charter], available at http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/
women_en.html (last visited May 20, 2004).
318. See Eleventh Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, 22nd-23rd Sess., at para. 33 (1997-1998), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/11thannualrpt.html (last visited May 20,
2004).
319. See id. at para. 33 (appointing Mme. Julienne Ondzeil-Gnelenga as the
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women).
320. See Draft Protocol to African Charter, supra note 317, at art. 2.
321. See id. at art. 4(2)(a) (calling for the prohibition of “all forms of violence
against women including unwanted or forced sex whether the violence takes place in
private or public . . . .”).
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draft form,322 thus, it cannot currently be enforced along with the
African Charter.
The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (“African
Commission”) was established in order to protect the rights
delineated in the African Charter (as well as in other pertinent
documents).323 According to Article 45, the commission has three
central functions: to promote and protect human rights and to
interpret the provisions of the African Charter.324 This body is also
tasked with overseeing inter-state complaints325 and “other
communications,” which include individual petitions.326 One author
observes:
The Commission’s mandate, articulated in Article 45 of the
Charter, is very broad, but in practice its activities have been
concentrated in three main areas: hosting conferences and
seminars to inform various constituencies of their rights and
obligations under the Charter; receiving periodic reports from
states parties; and examining communications (individual cases)
brought against governments for alleged violations of the rights in
the Charter. The Commission’s work on women’s rights takes place
within these areas of activity.327

While the African Commission “may resort to any appropriate
method of investigation,”328 its decisions take the form of
recommendations and it has been reluctant to challenge States Parties
for not complying with the African Charter.329 In June 1998, a
protocol to the African Charter was drafted in order to create an
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights that would issue
binding decisions.330 The protocol recently received the requisite

322. See Gina Bekker, Africa, 22 NETHERLANDS Q. HUM. RTS. 137, 138 (2004)
(explaining that the proposed Protocol to the African Charter does not yet have the
requisite number of ratifications to come into force).
323. See African Charter, supra note 11, at art. 30.
324. See id. at art. 45.
325. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 601; see also African Charter, supra note 11, at
arts. 47-54.
326. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 601; see also African Charter, supra note 11, at
arts. 55-58.
327. See Harrington, supra note 313, at 456.
328. African Charter, supra note 11, at art. 46.
329. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 601.
330. See id. at 600; see also Association for the Prevention of Torture, The African
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights; Presentation, Analysis and Commentary: The
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Establishing the
Court, at 3, Jan. 2000, available at http://www.apt.ch/africa/African%20Court.pdf
(last visited May 20, 2004).
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number of ratifications and came into force on January 25, 2004.331
Since the court is still in the developing stages, it has not received any
individual petitions yet; however it promises to be a much more
adequate forum for victims of domestic violence than the African
Commission.
CONCLUSION
This article is an attempt to assess the availability of mechanisms,
both at the international and regional level, through which domestic
violence victims can assert their rights against their state of citizenship
after exhausting all viable domestic remedies. The International Bill
of Human Rights, comprised of the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR,
other international human rights conventions such as CEDAW and
CAT, and regional human rights treaties such as the ECHR, ACHR
and the African Charter, offer general (as well as some specific)
protections for battered women. While I identified several provisions
within each instrument that could possibly apply in situations
involving domestic violence, these are not exhaustive lists.
International and regional human rights instruments are flexible and
can be invoked in various ways depending upon the situation of each
victim. Furthermore, the application of human rights instruments
varies depending upon possible reservations entered by each State
Party. When invoking such instruments, though, one should remain
aware of an overarching issue that straddles all human rights systems:
enforceability is still a lingering weakness.

331. Press Release, African Union, The Protocol on the African Court on Human
Rights and Peoples’ Rights to Come Into Force Soon (Dec. 30, 2003), at
http://www.pict-pcti.org/pdf/APHRC%20coming%20into%20force.pdf (last visited
May 20, 2004).
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